Denying the pattern is the surest way to repeat it
Quick: why is it that Australia can dominate both ODI and Test cricket at the same time (don’t look now but they are threatening to do it again), but when England or South Africa top the Test rankings, it seems to be at the expense of ODI form? I believe the answer goes to the heart of Protea choking.
After the 2011 World Cup Protea coach Corrie van Zyl was in denial. "The opposition see every opportunity to use the word 'chokers' on and off the field for one reason: to get at us mentally. But when our own fans keep reminding us of the past, it doesn't provide motivation, it just brings extra pressure. We need to deal with this in a different way as a nation, we need to stick together."
It is hard not to sympathise with Van Zyl: he had been in the coaching team at more of these choking events than any man deserves. At the 2011 event he had taken over the team only about a year before the World Cup – not long enough, arguably, to reshape them in his own style, to harden them for battle in the way that he might have planned. The last thing Van Zyl deserves is to be remembered as just another coach whose squad choked at the World Cup.
We’ll set aside for a moment the interesting, but somewhat irrelevant question about whether South Africa choked or panicked in 2011 – as Aakash Chopra commented on cricinfo: “The fundamental difference is that while you think too much when you choke, you think too little when you panic. While choking, you want to delay the inevitable, but when you panic you want to get over with it as soon as possible, for you can't bear the growing pressure.”
The unfortunate truth is that Van Zyl’s team choked, and instead of denial, one hopes they have spent the last four years acknowledging the fact. If not, they would make it all too easy for the next must-win opponent to distract them with a familiar taunt. But acknowledgement, difficult as it is, only takes you so far. If you are going to break a bad habit, you need a strategy. This is where the average Protea supporter may have reason to be nervous.
So what do the Australians do different from the English? The answer is tied into English culture, and the fact that English cricket is, almost by definition, an extension of that culture. Contrary to Winston Churchill’s high opinion of the unique abilities of English-speaking peoples, it is worth remembering that what makes the English unique in the world is their odd combination of free society with a severe case of ingrained classism. Applied to English cricket that means that there is a wall between players and coach, even between captain and coach that shall not be crossed, as Kevin Pietersen found out at the expense of his captaincy. The players do the playing, no more, no less. The coach, and only the coach, does the thinking. Works great in Test cricket where focussed robo-players get a strategy update every two hours. Not so much in ODI cricket, where a post fielding innings update is too late to affect the outcome of the current game. This is where the audacious Australian approach of allowing the players to think for themselves yield very different results.
Disappointingly, from a Protea supporter’s point of view, Graeme Smith moved the Proteas from the Australian approach (in turn the handiwork of Kepler Wessels) to the English approach. Even more disturbingly, the post-Smith era is promising to be no better: on June 6, 2013, South Africa opened their Championship Trophy campaign against India with a loss, after winning the toss and choosing to field. Many observers commented that the South Africans bowled too short for the conditions. The only man who could change that, captain AB de Villiers, however went to the post-match interview still spouting the “you can’t bowl too full against teams from the subcontinent” non-sense that he had been briefed on before the game. Focussed robo-player indeed.
In fairness to our Biff: there has been many occasions when focussed robo-batsmen have dragged the Proteas from the edge of the abyss to safer ground, and even improbably victories. As mentioned, it works in the slower-than-molasses Test cricket.
But ODI cricket is a different matter. More often than not knock-out games are won by teams who are able to surprise their opponents. No such luck with the robo-Proteas, focussed or otherwise. They don’t even believe in Plan B, for crying out loud!
Maybe it’s a South African thing - after all the Springbok approach to strategy can be summed up with the phrase: If Plan A does not work, we do plan A harder!
In fairness to the many dedicated Protea coaches who have lead the team since readmission: it is not that these coaches got it all wrong. Rather it is that it is impossible for a coach to get all the details right the night before. Like most other things, game plans need adjusting as the game unfolds. You can have a perfect Plan A, but if it is the only plan you have, you are asking for trouble. This is where the English approach is guaranteed to have limited success in ODI cricket, as the history of the English team confirms.
Of course, it’s not all doom and gloom. In AB de Villiers the Proteas have a captain that is as competitive and as positive as any in the game. He may yet learn to trust his own instincts, in spite of the deference captains are supposed to show to coaches under the English approach. In Dale Steyn De Villiers has a leader of the attack who is similarly competitive, and unlikely to let a coach’s opinion get between himself and victory.
Thursday, December 25, 2014
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
A Disastrous Outing to Australia
Did Australia just wreck South Africa’s World Cup campaign? Or did they unintentionally rescue it?
After South Africa’s 4-1 loss to Australia, the Protea World Cup campaign appears to have come crashing down to earth. “We are hurting, it’s not ideal, definitely not what we planned to do,” said captain AB de Villiers. More than anything the confidence of the team as a group, as well as that of certain individual players will have suffered. The case that Australia may have wrecked the South African World Cup campaign before it even officially started has its merits.
But it is worth recalling a recent World Cup campaign that got off to a very different lead-up, and ended in tears all the same: On 12 March 2006 Australia became the first team to score more than 400 runs in an ODI match. More to the point, the Australians didn’t just creep by the milestone, they went well beyond it, scoring 434/4 in their 50 overs. In what we South Africans certainly consider the greatest chase ever, South Africa not only became the second team to score 400, but passed the Australian total of the penultimate ball of the game, with all of one wicket in hand. Hershelle Gibbs’ recent comments during a test match at the same venue notwithstanding, it’s hard to imagine that a game of cricket can get more exciting than that.
The next time the two sides met was on 24 March 2007, at the World Cup. Basking in the confidence of the 438-game South Africa displayed some very ordinary fielding, allowing the Australians to score 377/6. They may not have been consciously thinking so, but it did seem as if the South African players were of the opinion that “no matter how many runs they score, we can score more.” But, unlike the result of the previous year, this time South Africa lost by a convincing 83 runs.
Worse was to follow. As is their wont, the Proteas qualified for the semi-final against Australia on April 25, winning their first must-win game at a World Cup against England. This time South Africa had a great plan: bat first, make 400+ runs and cruise to victory. Only it wasn’t a 400+ pitch, with the result that South Africa got 149 all out. 438 bought and paid for.
Clearly beating Australia isn’t necessarily ideal preparation for the World Cup. South Africans don’t do confidence in moderation. It does not follow, of course, that getting caned by the beloved gifappeltjies is the right way to prepare. But at least captain De Villiers and coach Russel Domingo had some of the leaks in the roof pointed out to them by Hurricane Australia. The questions for De Villiers and Domingo are: which are the priority leaks and how to repair those.
Much is made, for example, about the inability of the lower middle order to weigh in with a lot of runs. Ever since the days of Lance Klusener South African fans have come to expect rapid runs to flow from the last few overs. By and large the tradition has been upheld by a string of lower order big-hitters. But recently the pipeline appears to have run dry. To many observers this is a major problem.
It is worth pointing out that in the Protea team, lower order batting appears to have developed as a matter of necessity. During the 1992 World Cup, for example, Peter Kirsten was the only top order batsmen to contribute regular scores. During the 1999 campaign, Lance Klusener, batting at number nine, was man of the tournament, and not for his bowling. Klusener regularly hit his team of trouble with rapid-fire half centuries, often adding key runs for the last wicket. Apart from the fact that that couldn’t possibly last, one has to wonder about the inability of the top order to score the runs. As a comparison, Dale Steyn is currently the regular number nine. While Steyn is no slouch with the bat, it would be quite surprising if he is South Africa’s top run scorer in the 2015 World Cup. And if he was, who would expect it to be a successful campaign?
The difference between top and lower order runs is often a matter of perception. When the top order fails, but the lower order succeeds, there is primarily a sense of relief. On top of that, top order failures are often dismissed as the result of difficult batting conditions, excellent bowling, and the like. When the situation is reversed, and the top order succeeds, but the lower fails, there is a profound sense of disappointment, as if the lower order left a large number of runs on the table, and, really, the total should have been much larger. Blame the tendency of commentators to take up the convenient topic of projected scores during the latter part of the innings.
The reality is, of course, that runs are runs, whether they come at the start of the innings, the end of the innings, or at an indifferent pace throughout. On the two occasions that South Africa set scores they posted 267/8 and 280/6, both of which appeared to be defendable. Before this tour, Australia’s last successful chase of 250+ against South Africa was in 2002. This would suggest that defending totals is the issue, more than setting them. Likewise, the fact that the attack leaked at least 300 in two of the first three games suggest the concern is bowling (and fielding). Of even more concern: since readmission, this has traditionally been Protea strengths.
The current Protea test attack is rightly the envy of the world, and has proven itself able to adapt to various conditions as the fact that they haven’t lost a test series away from home since 2006 confirms, along with the top ranking for the team. It is not without reason that Dale Steyn is rated the world’s best bowler in the format, backed up by Vernon Philander at #6.
In the ODI format, things are rather less stellar: Steyn ranks #3, followed by Morné Morkel at #11 and Lonwabo Tsotsobe at #17. Of course, the rankings tend to be a bit of a lagging indicator, averaging a player’s form over the last couple of years, as evidenced by the fact that Philander ranks #51. Nonetheless, the evidence would suggest that the terrific Protea test attack is much less of a threat in ODIs.
The difference between test and ODI bowling is that in the former the aim is to take wickets, while in the latter it is to choke (that word again) the flow of runs. Unlike say Fanie de Villiers, Dale Steyn appears to struggle more with choking than with knocking over, his career average economy rate a rather pedestrian 4.8, compared to a downright insulting 5.4 on this tour. Philander’s slightly better career average (4.4) was at least maintained on this tour (4.5). Morkel’s tour figures were embarrassing (6.1) and will affect his career average (4.9) the wrong way. The case for Kyle Abbott stepping up (career : 4.4) was only enhanced on a difficult tour (5.1), while it will be interesting to see if the selectors have faith that Farhaan Behardien whose (brief) career average matches Steyn’s, while looking much better on this tour (4.7). Interestingly, Tsotsobe has the same career average, which hardly suggests that he is the answer to the questions so rudely asked by Australia.
Of course, wickets are not completely irrelevant in ODI cricket, and Steyn proved again that he has the ability to break partnerships, taking four of his seven wickets before the death. By comparison, seven of Morkel’s ten wickets fell at the death suggesting that it batsmen getting themselves out by getting too greedy.
It is also worth noting that while the Protea combined economy rate for the tour (5.46) matched that of Australia (5.44), the death bowling was a different matter all together (Proteas: 7.1; Australia: 6.1). Here Robbie Peterson (5.1) and Philander (5.3) were the standouts, although they only bowled 3.1 and 4 death overs, respectively. Abbott (6.0 in 5 overs) and Steyn (6.5 in 11.4) were middle of the road, while Morkel (7.2 in 11) and Wayne Parnell (8.0 in 4) were underwhelming. The less said about Ryan McLaren (11.0 in 4), the better. Bottom line: the Proteas have an issue with death bowling. The (very limited) data would suggest that Peterson and Philander should share the death bowling with Abbott and Steyn.
One sensed that when both Parnell and McLaren were selected for the fourth game, the selectors weren’t looking to win the series, but rather to test different combinations. In that case, it is mission accomplished, and McLaren should be watching the World Cup from the comfort of home, while Parnell and Morkel should only travel as backups. It is also high time for the selectors to overcome their Warne envy and admit South Africa simply doesn’t have a spin bowler that can dominate batsmen (and be a jack while doing it). Thanks Imran, but we’ve seen enough.
The Australians can be said to have rained on the Proteas’ parade. In doing so they revealed many leaks in the roof. Whether the Proteas repair those leaks is first of all up to the selectors. Assuming they are brave enough to pick the right personnel, it is over to De Villiers and Domingo. And that’s a whole discussion by itself…
After South Africa’s 4-1 loss to Australia, the Protea World Cup campaign appears to have come crashing down to earth. “We are hurting, it’s not ideal, definitely not what we planned to do,” said captain AB de Villiers. More than anything the confidence of the team as a group, as well as that of certain individual players will have suffered. The case that Australia may have wrecked the South African World Cup campaign before it even officially started has its merits.
But it is worth recalling a recent World Cup campaign that got off to a very different lead-up, and ended in tears all the same: On 12 March 2006 Australia became the first team to score more than 400 runs in an ODI match. More to the point, the Australians didn’t just creep by the milestone, they went well beyond it, scoring 434/4 in their 50 overs. In what we South Africans certainly consider the greatest chase ever, South Africa not only became the second team to score 400, but passed the Australian total of the penultimate ball of the game, with all of one wicket in hand. Hershelle Gibbs’ recent comments during a test match at the same venue notwithstanding, it’s hard to imagine that a game of cricket can get more exciting than that.
The next time the two sides met was on 24 March 2007, at the World Cup. Basking in the confidence of the 438-game South Africa displayed some very ordinary fielding, allowing the Australians to score 377/6. They may not have been consciously thinking so, but it did seem as if the South African players were of the opinion that “no matter how many runs they score, we can score more.” But, unlike the result of the previous year, this time South Africa lost by a convincing 83 runs.
Worse was to follow. As is their wont, the Proteas qualified for the semi-final against Australia on April 25, winning their first must-win game at a World Cup against England. This time South Africa had a great plan: bat first, make 400+ runs and cruise to victory. Only it wasn’t a 400+ pitch, with the result that South Africa got 149 all out. 438 bought and paid for.
Clearly beating Australia isn’t necessarily ideal preparation for the World Cup. South Africans don’t do confidence in moderation. It does not follow, of course, that getting caned by the beloved gifappeltjies is the right way to prepare. But at least captain De Villiers and coach Russel Domingo had some of the leaks in the roof pointed out to them by Hurricane Australia. The questions for De Villiers and Domingo are: which are the priority leaks and how to repair those.
Much is made, for example, about the inability of the lower middle order to weigh in with a lot of runs. Ever since the days of Lance Klusener South African fans have come to expect rapid runs to flow from the last few overs. By and large the tradition has been upheld by a string of lower order big-hitters. But recently the pipeline appears to have run dry. To many observers this is a major problem.
It is worth pointing out that in the Protea team, lower order batting appears to have developed as a matter of necessity. During the 1992 World Cup, for example, Peter Kirsten was the only top order batsmen to contribute regular scores. During the 1999 campaign, Lance Klusener, batting at number nine, was man of the tournament, and not for his bowling. Klusener regularly hit his team of trouble with rapid-fire half centuries, often adding key runs for the last wicket. Apart from the fact that that couldn’t possibly last, one has to wonder about the inability of the top order to score the runs. As a comparison, Dale Steyn is currently the regular number nine. While Steyn is no slouch with the bat, it would be quite surprising if he is South Africa’s top run scorer in the 2015 World Cup. And if he was, who would expect it to be a successful campaign?
The difference between top and lower order runs is often a matter of perception. When the top order fails, but the lower order succeeds, there is primarily a sense of relief. On top of that, top order failures are often dismissed as the result of difficult batting conditions, excellent bowling, and the like. When the situation is reversed, and the top order succeeds, but the lower fails, there is a profound sense of disappointment, as if the lower order left a large number of runs on the table, and, really, the total should have been much larger. Blame the tendency of commentators to take up the convenient topic of projected scores during the latter part of the innings.
The reality is, of course, that runs are runs, whether they come at the start of the innings, the end of the innings, or at an indifferent pace throughout. On the two occasions that South Africa set scores they posted 267/8 and 280/6, both of which appeared to be defendable. Before this tour, Australia’s last successful chase of 250+ against South Africa was in 2002. This would suggest that defending totals is the issue, more than setting them. Likewise, the fact that the attack leaked at least 300 in two of the first three games suggest the concern is bowling (and fielding). Of even more concern: since readmission, this has traditionally been Protea strengths.
The current Protea test attack is rightly the envy of the world, and has proven itself able to adapt to various conditions as the fact that they haven’t lost a test series away from home since 2006 confirms, along with the top ranking for the team. It is not without reason that Dale Steyn is rated the world’s best bowler in the format, backed up by Vernon Philander at #6.
In the ODI format, things are rather less stellar: Steyn ranks #3, followed by Morné Morkel at #11 and Lonwabo Tsotsobe at #17. Of course, the rankings tend to be a bit of a lagging indicator, averaging a player’s form over the last couple of years, as evidenced by the fact that Philander ranks #51. Nonetheless, the evidence would suggest that the terrific Protea test attack is much less of a threat in ODIs.
The difference between test and ODI bowling is that in the former the aim is to take wickets, while in the latter it is to choke (that word again) the flow of runs. Unlike say Fanie de Villiers, Dale Steyn appears to struggle more with choking than with knocking over, his career average economy rate a rather pedestrian 4.8, compared to a downright insulting 5.4 on this tour. Philander’s slightly better career average (4.4) was at least maintained on this tour (4.5). Morkel’s tour figures were embarrassing (6.1) and will affect his career average (4.9) the wrong way. The case for Kyle Abbott stepping up (career : 4.4) was only enhanced on a difficult tour (5.1), while it will be interesting to see if the selectors have faith that Farhaan Behardien whose (brief) career average matches Steyn’s, while looking much better on this tour (4.7). Interestingly, Tsotsobe has the same career average, which hardly suggests that he is the answer to the questions so rudely asked by Australia.
Of course, wickets are not completely irrelevant in ODI cricket, and Steyn proved again that he has the ability to break partnerships, taking four of his seven wickets before the death. By comparison, seven of Morkel’s ten wickets fell at the death suggesting that it batsmen getting themselves out by getting too greedy.
It is also worth noting that while the Protea combined economy rate for the tour (5.46) matched that of Australia (5.44), the death bowling was a different matter all together (Proteas: 7.1; Australia: 6.1). Here Robbie Peterson (5.1) and Philander (5.3) were the standouts, although they only bowled 3.1 and 4 death overs, respectively. Abbott (6.0 in 5 overs) and Steyn (6.5 in 11.4) were middle of the road, while Morkel (7.2 in 11) and Wayne Parnell (8.0 in 4) were underwhelming. The less said about Ryan McLaren (11.0 in 4), the better. Bottom line: the Proteas have an issue with death bowling. The (very limited) data would suggest that Peterson and Philander should share the death bowling with Abbott and Steyn.
One sensed that when both Parnell and McLaren were selected for the fourth game, the selectors weren’t looking to win the series, but rather to test different combinations. In that case, it is mission accomplished, and McLaren should be watching the World Cup from the comfort of home, while Parnell and Morkel should only travel as backups. It is also high time for the selectors to overcome their Warne envy and admit South Africa simply doesn’t have a spin bowler that can dominate batsmen (and be a jack while doing it). Thanks Imran, but we’ve seen enough.
The Australians can be said to have rained on the Proteas’ parade. In doing so they revealed many leaks in the roof. Whether the Proteas repair those leaks is first of all up to the selectors. Assuming they are brave enough to pick the right personnel, it is over to De Villiers and Domingo. And that’s a whole discussion by itself…
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