Andrew Hudson's Fully Paid Vacation

Somehow Hudson's role in the selection fiasco escaped all attention
Much has been made about the Protea selection debacle, with late night texts from South Africa apparently forcing coach Russell Domingo to change the team to include more players of colour. These reports have been furiously denied by the head of Cricket South Africa, Haroon Lorgat, and sports minister, Fikile Mbalula. Their fervour is touching, but unconvincing. Let’s just say that South African politicians have never been associated too closely with the truth, and, more depressingly, this does not appear to be changing.

The reality, though, is that Andrew Hudson and his fellow selectors got their team selection completely wrong, and having Vernon Philander forced upon them just made their flawed thinking more obvious. Recall the lengthy debate about the number seven spot in the South African batting line up. What exactly did the much debated number seven spot contribute to the campaign? The most impressive contribution, no doubt, was JP Duminy’s hat trick against Sri Lanka. The other significant contribution was Farhaan Behardien’s 64* against UAE. Other than those two, number seven weighed in with a total of 47 runs and two (count ‘em!) wickets. Most objective observers would agree that even without Behardien’s runs against UAE, South Africa should have won the game. That leaves us with the conclusion that the only arguable match-winning contribution came with the ball. Hardly surprising, considering that the number seven didn’t bat in three of the eight games, but bowled in every game but against West Indies, when the wickets fell so regularly that Faf du Plessis got three overs to compliment his ODI record. The other statistic that jumps out is Wayne Parnell conceding 85 in 9, arguably fatally damaging the Protea cause in the important game against India. He’s not alone: Against Pakistan Duminy conceded 34 in 3, and against New Zealand 43 in 5, against Zimbabwe Behardien conceded 40 in 5. Seems clear that number seven did more with the ball than with the bat. And excluding Duminy’s hat trick against Sri Lanka, it was ALL bad.

On the other hand, as the tournament went on, the selectors seem to decide if they didn’t have an allrounder they could rely on as number seven (Parnell or Behardien), they would just pick another batsman, Rilee Rossouw, and effectively shift Duminy down to the number seven spot. Rossouw, of course, did more than enough to justify his selection. But sometimes your biggest tactical mistakes comes camouflaged in the seduction of short term success. Adding Rossouw to the team meant basically going one bowler short. That has the potential to work fine, if Dale Steyn was firing on all cylinders, taking key wickets at key moments and inspiring the rest of the attack to follow suit. Leading the attack, as he always seems to do. That did not happen in this World Cup, as the fact that Steyn was the most expensive of the recognised bowlers and bowled 31.5 balls per wicket, narrowly beating out Philander (33.8) and Duminy (33.7), but way behind the leaders: Abbott (14.4), Morkel (17.6) and Tahir (21.5). It appears Andrew Hudson and his fellow selectors never noticed. Analysis and spreadsheets are slow to pick these things up. You need to be awake and watching carefully. With all due respect, this does not appear to be where Andrew Hudson was.

South Africa’s leading wicket takers at the tournament, Tahir (17 wickets for the tournament) and Morkel (15), did well, of course, but neither man leads an attack, the way Steyn (11), at his normal level of play, does. Vernon Philander (4 in 4 games), at his best, has the potential to lead the attack, but suffice to say: at this tournament he was never close to his best, producing statistics similar to those of Duminy (6 in 6 games). That led to the strange development that occurred in the quarterfinal against Sri Lanka: Kyle Abbott (9 in 4 games) leading the attack, inspiring the great Steyn himself, setting the table for Tahir and Duminy to finish a still-impressive Sri Lankan batting line-up off. At the conclusion of that quarterfinal the conclusion was obvious: Abbott had to play in the semi-final. Alleged political interference, unfortunate as it is, does not change this. Where were you, when we needed you, Andrew Hudson?

Playing both Philander and Abbott would have meant making one of three tough calls: (1) dropping a certain out-of-form batsman, (2) dropping an in-form batsman, or (3) dropping an out-of-form bowler, legend or not. The first option seems like the obvious one: drop Quinton de Kock, a man who simply did not do enough to justify his continued selection, his good innings against Sri Lanka notwithstanding. De Kock averaged 21 in the tournament. The only other batsman to average less than 50, was fellow opener Hashim Amla, who still managed double De Kock’s average. Notably, in the semi-final, with the pressure back on, De Kock looked far less convincing, and got himself out after playing himself in. Of course, dropping De Kock affects the balance of the team, given that he is also the wicketkeeper. Skipper De Villiers would have been an unwilling replacement, and taking the gloves may well have limited his ability to communicate with his bowlers. In the aftermath of a gut-wrenching loss against New Zealand, De Villiers would probably be prepared to admit: he could have figured this out, if it helped his team cross the line.

The second option available to Andrew Hudson would have been dropping the in-form Rilee Rossouw. This would have been hugely unfair to the player, but such is the price you pay for political interference. It is worth noting that in the lost semi-final Rossouw contributed an important 39 off 53 balls, and had to enter the game in the eighth over, suggesting that the final total might have been much less than 281 if he did not play. Nonetheless, the fact that remains that with a limp and leaderless attack, no amount of runs will win you the game, as was eventually so painfully proven.

The third option would have required Mr. Hudson to put some serious manhood on display: dropping Dale Steyn. After all, Steyn was the joint most expensive bowler on the day, and the worst recognized Protea bowler at the tournament (not counting the politically favoured Philander). Crucially, Steyn was unable to defend 11 runs in the final over. The problem is, of course, that cricket is a game where respect often overrules logic, and, as with the second option, it is hugely unfair to suggest that the player under discussion was responsible for the loss.

Someone had to make a tough call. This was the moment Andrew Hudson could step up, and pull his country through. I know, it's not fair at all to require such a tough decision from the chairman of selectors, caused by an unnecessary interference from people who apparently couldn't care less if the South African team made it to the final, or not. But that's the ugly reality.

Now Hudson is stepping down, no doubt worn down by the unseen, and cowardly interference he had to deal with. His legacy, such as it is, will forever be coloured by a fiasco that was not of his own making. A failed World Cup campaign the final entry on his CV. Well, at least Corrie van Zyl won't be alone.